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Abstract
In February 2012, less than two weeks before that year’s presidential elections in Russia, a
two-minute video of young women in brightly colored masks and short dresses was uploaded to
YouTube. The video featured four members of the Pussy Riot punk feminist band performing a
wild dance in front of the altar of Russia’s main Orthodox temple, the Cathedral of Christ the Sav-
ior in Moscow. Lip-syncing to a song, which they called a punk prayer, they beseeched the Virgin
Mary to “drive” Vladimir Putin, then the prime minister and a presidential candidate, “away.” Af-
ter generating scads of international publicity, the case ended with the three band members being
sentenced to prison for two years on charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.
The clearly provocative nature of the performance – with costume changes mid-scene and anti-
government, anti-Church protest slogans set to the music of a sacred Orthodox song – made the
Pussy Riot case a springboard to discussion of the acceptability of religiously contextualized polit-
ical speech in contemporary Russia. Through a critical discourse analysis of the original lyrics of
the punk prayer and the report from the psychological and linguistic experts that formed the basis
of the prosecutor’s case, this article explores the discursive devices and rhetorical strategies em-
ployed in these texts to challenge or sustain the existing power relations in Russia. As the analysis
makes clear, while the punk prayer criticizes State and the Russian Orthodox Church as oppres-
sive and corrupt by disrupting and denaturalizing the images typically associated with their rituals
and spaces, the report normalizes conformity, depoliticizes Pussy Riot critique, and delegitimizes
public political protests by pushing them beyond the boundaries of socially acceptable forms of
citizens’ civic participation.
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Pussy Riot vs. Civil Obedience: A Critical 
Discourse Analysis of Two Texts 
Volha Kananovich 
In February 2012, at the height of that year’s presidential campaign in Russia, a short 
video was uploaded to YouTube by a member of the Pussy Riot punk feminist band 
(Matveeva). The video featured four young women in brightly colored masks and 
short dresses in front of the altar of Russia’s major Orthodox temple, the Cathedral 
of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Lifting their legs, kneeling and crossing themselves, 
the women lip-synced a “punk prayer” that they had set to the music of a sacred 
Orthodox song,1 in which they pleaded with the Virgin Mary to “drive Putin,” who 
was running for his third presidential term, “away.”  
The clip, which also contained scenes from an earlier Pussy Riot performance in 
another cathedral, lasted a little less than two minutes. It was nearly twice as long as 
the actual performance, a fact revealed five months later in court, in which three 
Pussy Riot members identified by the police as the participants of that performance – 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Mariya Alyokhina, and Ekaterina Samutsevich – were 
put on trial and charged with hooliganism motivated by religious hatred (“Opub-
likovano”). Heavily covered by the domestic and international media (“O Pussy 
Riot”), accompanied by mass protests (“Pussy Riot Supporters”), comments and 
appeals from government officials (Nakamura and Weiner) and public figures 
(“Madonna Urges Russia”; “Yoko Ono Awards”) around the world, the trial ended 
in August 2012. The women were found guilty and sentenced to two years in a penal 
colony (“Prigovor”).  
In October 2012, Samutsevich’s term was converted into a suspended sentence 
(Tsoi and Ledniov). Tolokonnikova and Alyokhina were freed from prison three 
months before their scheduled release, in December 2013 (“Jailed Pussy Riot Activ-
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ists”). The reason for their release, as the Russian authorities emphasized, was a na-
tionwide amnesty to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Russian constitution, 
but it was interpreted by the band members as a PR stunt (“Freed Pussy Riot Activ-
ists”) before the Olympic Games that were hosted by Russia in February 2014. 
The timing and the multitude of the conflicting interpretations of the performance 
have transformed the Pussy Riot affair – using the term that that Chilton made fa-
mous – into a “critical discourse moment” (12) that put issues of religious satire, 
political critique, and the boundaries of free speech at the center of public discourse 
in Russia.  
The video footage itself, however, was far from remarkable in terms of the audi-
ence reached: two years after the performance, the number of views on YouTube did 
not exceed 3 million, a figure hardly comparable to that for videos considered viral 
(Broxton et al.). While the video footage did find its way to a wider audience by 
other means, such as TV broadcasts or pictures in newspapers, the lyrics were usual-
ly mentioned in passing, with references not going far beyond citing the title of the 
prayer. When demonstrated on mainstream Russian TV as part of the news reports 
that covered the trial, the video of the performance was generally accompanied not 
by the original soundtrack, but by the comments of reporters or experts who most 
often suggested its blasphemous nature. The clearly provocative visual component 
of the performance made it an easy target for such interpretations, which led to over-
looking the content of the prayer.  
One of the rare lengthy readings of the prayer was provided in court, in the form 
of a 21-page report from the psychological and linguistic experts who supported the 
prosecutor’s case (Feygin) and were cited in the court decision (“Prigovor”). Aiming 
to refute Pussy Riot’s claims that the performance was a political critique and to 
present the performance as having been motivated primarily by religious hatred, the 
experts conducted a complicated semantic analysis to argue that the performance 
was self-evidently “unacceptable” to Russian society, making the report quite an 
interesting discursive product of its own. 
In the independent Russian media and abroad, the performance was usually de-
scribed—in line with the explanations provided by Pussy Riot in court—as having 
been targeted at the growing ties between church and state. Yet, even these descrip-
tions were quite understandably devoid of many specifics embedded in the cultural 
and historical context, which underrated the potential value of the performance for 
providing insight into the power relations in contemporary Russia that it meant to 
challenge. Recent articles (Bernstein, Denysenko, Prozorov, Storch) and books 
(Brysk, Gessen) have attempted to contextualize Pussy Riot’s performance and the 
political discourse they oppose by looking at them through the lenses of parody, 
profanation, body politics, law, and even the concept of “holy fools” in the pattern of 
Christian prophets. This article contributes to this discussion by conducting a com-
parative analysis of the Pussy Riot text and the experts’ report as its discursive op-
ponent. 
Through a critical discourse analysis of the original lyrics of the “punk prayer” 
and the expert report, this article demonstrates that, although they both describe the 
case as a struggle between the alliance of state and church, on the one hand, and the 
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opponents of these close ties, on the other, their discursive devices and rhetorical 
strategies serve opposite goals. The prayer challenges the social norms sustained by 
the state and religious authorities, while the report intends to naturalize these norms 
and discredit religiously contextualized political protests as crossing the boundaries 
of legitimate public debate.  
Critical Discourse Analysis  
In its theoretical framework, this research is guided by critical discourse analysis. 
Drawing on insights from linguistics, semiotics, literary theory, social cognition, 
rhetoric, cultural studies, and other disciplines, critical discourse analysis does not 
offer a single set of analytical tools but instead can be viewed as an umbrella term 
for denoting an approach to studying discourse as “talk and text in social practice” 
(O’Reilly et al. 249). What unites critical discourse analysts regardless of their meth-
odological preferences is the view of language as a product of and tool for social 
construction: “language both shapes and is shaped by society” (Machin and Mayr 4).  
A particular concern of critical discourse analysis is power relations. Language is 
never neutral. Instead, it should be viewed as a set of resources purposefully chosen 
by communicators to serve particular ideological purposes (Kress). In this sense, 
power relations are inherently discursive, that is, they are exercised, practiced – and 
hence can be studied – through discourse (Fairclough and Wodak). The purpose of 
critical discourse analysis is therefore to expose the underlying ideology of texts by 
asking what types of power interests are “buried” in them and “what possible ideo-
logical goals they might serve” (Machin and Mayr 5). Central to this theoretical en-
deavor is a focus on the role of discourse in the “(re)production and challenge of 
dominance” (Van Dijk 249) and power abuse. The latter is defined as “breaches of 
laws, rules and principles of democracy, equality and justice by those who wield 
power” (Van Dijk 255). This makes critical discourse analysis a particularly relevant 
theoretical framework for analyzing both the “punk prayer,” which explicitly chal-
lenged what the Pussy Riot members viewed as the abuse of political power by Putin 
and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the experts’ report, which, in view of the 
questionable fairness of the verdict (Kananovich), was viewed by critics as a con-
tributor to legitimizing this abuse. The aforementioned diversity of methodological 
tools used by critical discourse analysis (Blommaert and Bulcaen 450) provides re-
searchers with flexibility in choosing those research questions and procedures that 
are most applicable to the topic under study.  
Aiming to reveal whose power each of these texts intends to challenge or sustain, 
the first question that needs to be asked is which social actors these texts vest with 
agency. Defined as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (Ahearn 112), the 
concept of agency introduces a useful distinction between an actor, a person whose 
actions are rule-governed or rule-oriented, and an agent, a person who is engaged in 
the exercise of power as (re)constituting the world (Karp 137) and not “just follow-
ing orders” (Moses 205). According to some theorists, possessing agency is inevita-
bly associated with resistance to the status quo (Goddard 3) and domination (Frank 
286). Although some other theorists have questioned the usefulness of addressing 
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agency within a dualistic framework, “one in which norms are conceptualized on the 
model of doing and undoing, consolidation and subversion” (Mahmood 23), opposi-
tional agency remains one of the most prominent forms of exercising agency in texts 
(Ahearn 115), making it reasonable to frame the first research question as follows: 
RQ1: What social actors are portrayed in the texts as possessing 
agency? In cases of the limited or absent agency of certain actors, 
whose power is presented as constraining their capacity to act? 
The second research question is closely related to the specific aim of this study of 
exploring rhetorical strategies employed in the texts to sustain or challenge the exist-
ing boundaries of legitimate public debate. One particular strategy appears to be of 
particular relevance here. Provisionally called “the strategy of naturalizing,” it refers 
to the idea of language as an ideological instrument that is used to create, maintain, 
and legitimize certain types of social practices by presenting them as normal, neutral, 
and taken-for-granted (Machin and Mayr 5), (Van Dijk 250) and, vice versa, con-
demning the practices that challenge the promoted way of action as being unnatural 
and contradictory to common sense. Therefore, the following question can be asked: 
RQ2: What social practices are presented in both texts as 
(un)natural and (ab)normal? 
Finally, approaching language as a set of resources to achieve a particular ideo-
logical purpose demands studying not only the manifest content presented in the text 
but also the content that could have been reasonably expected to be there but is ab-
sent (Fairclough) and can only be revealed – using Machin and Mayr’s term – “by 
looking for absences” (2). This rhetorical strategy of exclusion can be studied by 
asking the following question: 
RQ3: What contextual aspects of the Pussy Riot performance rel-
evant to decoding its message are absent from the texts? What 
ideological explanations do these absences suggest?2 
In Search of Agency 
The Pussy Riot prayer, according to its almost literal translation from Russian into 
English provided by the band members themselves (“Alekhina and Others v. Rus-
sia”), reads as follows: 
 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away 
Drive Putin away, drive Putin away 
Black robe, golden epaulettes 
Parishioners crawl to bow 
The phantom of liberty is in heaven 
Gay pride sent to Siberia in chains 
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The head of the KGB, their chief saint, 
Leads protesters to prison under escort 
So as not to offend His Holiness 
Women must give birth and love 
Shit, shit, holy shit! 
Shit, shit, holy shit! 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, become a feminist 
Become a feminist, become a feminist 
The Church’s praise of rotten dictators 
The cross-bearer procession of black limousines 
A teacher-preacher will meet you at school 
Go to class – bring him cash! 
Patriarch Gundyay3 believes in Putin 
Bitch, better believe in God instead 
The belt of the Virgin can’t replace rallies 
Mary, Mother of God, is with us in protest! 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away 
Drive Putin away, drive Putin away. 
 
Studying the Pussy Riot prayer through the lens of the first research question re-
veals that almost all social actors are denied agency there. The prayer starts with the 
statement, “Parishioners crawl to bow,” which uses verbs with a clear servile conno-
tation. While bowing is an element of the Orthodox veneration ritual (Agapov), 
crawling, although found in some celebrations (“V Tutaeve”), is predominantly 
practiced as an element of the monastic tonsure ceremony (Ilarion) and can hardly be 
considered a component of parishioners’ typical routines. This phrasing suggests 
both the metaphoric nature of this rhetorical device and its intention to emphasize the 
submissiveness expected of Orthodox believers and the lack of agency accorded to 
them. 
A second social group that has to meet certain expectations is that of women, 
who, according to the prayer, “must give birth and love.” The actual decisions made 
by women are omitted from the narration and are not the subject of any serious dis-
cussion or consideration; it is unclear whether they decide to resist, negotiate, or 
acquiesce to these hegemonic gender norms. The focus is placed on the standards 
themselves to which women are held, “giving” rather than receiving love. This in-
terpretation is emphasized by the ending of the phrase – as it turns out, “women must 
give birth and love / In order not to offend His Holiness.” Referred to here by his 
church title, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill I of Moscow 
is presented as possessing the ultimate regulatory and motivational power. However, 
this turns out to be a hasty conclusion, for according to the last verse of the prayer, 
there is someone else whose power this allegedly almighty head of the church ac-
cepts as being even more significant than his own. This someone is not God: “Patri-
arch Gundyay believes in Putin.” Remarkably, the name by which the Patriarch is 
addressed in this verse is not his official title, by which he is referred to in the previ-
ous verses that were meant to reinforce his power. Neither is it his church name, 
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Kirill. The name used here is a pejorative, derisive version of his secular name, 
Gundyaev, which was widely used in Russian social media (“Gundyay”, Lebedev).  
By putting the head of the state above the head of the church and equating him 
with God (note the full version of the excerpt, “Patriarch Gundyay believes in Putin 
/ Bitch, better believe in God instead”), the text evokes the long tradition of the sa-
cralization of the monarch in Russia. The idea of parallelism between the monarch 
and God was borrowed from Byzantium as part of the Christianization of the Rus-
sian state, but it went much further than that, up to the monarch’s assimilation of the 
functions of the head of the church, which made the sacralization of the monarch a 
part of the state mechanism (Uspenskij and Zhivov 78). By evoking the similarities 
between the absolute power of the monarch in the Russian Empire and that of Putin 
in contemporary Russia, the text portrays him as the regulatory and oppressive 
agent. 
This idea is supported further by the following verse: “The head of the KGB, their 
chief saint, / Leads protesters to prison,” portraying Putin, a former head of the 
KGB's successor, the FSB4, as the agent who can take away freedom in the literal 
sense. Notably, those who are led by Putin to prison as well as those described in a 
similar statement, “Gay pride [that is, members of the LGBT community] sent to 
Siberia5 in chains,” are portrayed in the prayer as the only actors who consciously 
resist domination and can therefore be considered agents in the strictest understand-
ing of this term. 
In this situation, when those who, besides Putin, possess agency and have to pay 
for it with their freedom, the authors of the prayer turn to the figure whose power has 
not yet been contested in the text and who could therefore challenge Putin’s domina-
tion – the Virgin Mary, by famously asking her to “drive Putin away.” 
Even more interesting results are revealed in the close reading of the experts’ re-
port. Using Halliday’s classification of verbs as representing action, the report por-
trays the Pussy Riot members as active “doers” of not only behavioral processes 
(according to the report, they “sing, dance, cry”). While this portrayal may be ex-
plained as an intent to merely lay out the facts of the case, it also describes mental 
and material processes with clearly negative connotations: “humiliate, violate, com-
mit.” By doing so, the report constructs the Pussy Riot members as “focalisers” of 
action and allows them “an internal view of themselves” (Machin and Mayr 107). 
Usually, this discursive device encourages empathy with the actors by humanizing 
them in the eyes of the reader. This is not what the report intends to achieve. By 
claiming to be providing insight into the actual motivations of the Pussy Riot mem-
bers and presenting those as inherently violent and destructive, the report uses this 
device for exactly the opposite effect.  
In addition to the Pussy Riot members, one would expect a strong position of 
agency from the authors of the report. Despite being informed by scholarship, the 
report is understood by Russian law as presenting the personal opinions of experts as 
individual, independent consultants. Neither their religious affiliations nor their insti-
tutional interests should affect their view of the case, which should supposedly take 
away the burden of any factors that might constrain their independent decision mak-
ing and allow them to freely express their professional judgment. The more remark-
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able it is that throughout the entire report, the experts – using Van Leeuwen’s term – 
are de-agentalized (96) by not being referenced in the text as the “doers” of the deci-
sion making process. Examples of sentences in which they present their findings 
include “the analysis of the lyrics reveals . . .” and “the examination of the perfor-
mance allows to identify . . .” The use of the nominalization “analysis” and “inquiry” 
instead of alternative options like “We analyzed the lyrics and concluded . . .” or 
“We examined the performance and identified…” conceals the agent of the action 
and presents the latter as an abstract, objective, dehumanized activity existing in its 
own right and being uninfluenced by the personal or institutional interests of the 
authors of the report.  
The only section of the report that does mention the experts’ names is the one 
where it cannot be avoided by definition – the preamble, a mandatory section that 
assigns the responsibilities to each member of the expert team. Even here, the report 
uses passive verbs: “the answer to questions 1 and 2 was given 
by . . .Abramenkova,” which results in “backgrounding” and decentering the experts 
from their actions.  
A similar discursive device is used in the section that concerns one of the most 
heavily criticized aspects of the prosecution’s case (Kananovich) used to prove the 
presence of the two defining elements of criminally punishable hooliganism in the 
Pussy Riot performance: the manifestation of the patent contempt of society (as an 
aspect of actus reus) and the motive of religious hatred (as a part of mens rea). 
Without proving the presence of these elements, the prosecution’s claim that Pussy 
Riot’s actions are criminal should have been refuted by the Court and been trans-
formed into an administrative offense. To prove the presence of these elements, the 
prosecution posed two separate questions6 to the experts that demanded two inde-
pendently justified answers. On the contrary, however, the experts elected to com-
bine them within one answer. The rhetorical devices chosen to justify this otherwise 
unexplained decision are particularly revealing: “[In view of the circumstances of 
the case], it was considered to be reasonable and appropriate to combine the exam-
ination of the materials within the first and second questions.” Presented this way, 
the exact circumstances that would justify the violation of the legal decision making 
logic remained backgrounded. Using the words “reasonable” and “appropriate” 
without specifying what exactly makes the experts’ decision reasonable and what 
makes it appropriate gives the impression of being detailed, well-thought-out, and 
precise, without being such, and presents the rhetorical strategy of “strategic ambigu-
ity” (Wood and Kroger). Similarly concealed remains the agent responsible for 
“considering,” which, once again, removes the sense of agency from the process of 
this questionable decision making. 
In fact, the only actor whom the report portrays as possessing the agency strong 
enough to oppose the negatively connoted agency of Pussy Riot is the State. Accord-
ing to the report, the State “respects the norms set by religious institutions” and 
“support[s] the rules [of public behavior in religious buildings] with legal norms,” 
thus playing the patronizing role of the agent who sets the rules of the game and 
ensures the proper behavior of society members for the public good. In this situation, 
the report presents the case as a struggle between evil disrupters of social order and a 
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fair, though strict, protector of the public peace. 
Portraying as (Un)Natural as a Rhetorical Strategy 
The rhetorical strategy undertaken by Pussy Riot can be described as a purposeful 
juxtaposition of opposites, or – using the term of the report – a “combination of the 
sacred and profane.” Little in the text is portrayed as being natural and commonsen-
sical, starting with the very title of the song, “punk prayer.” It combines punk, a 
movement known for its anti-establishment philosophy and promotion of individual 
freedom in a visually provocative way (Kugelberg and Savage), with prayer, an 
intimate, inwardly oriented activity and a hallmark of the Orthodox religion built on 
the principles of conciliarism, or sobornost, a loving, caring fellowship of believers, 
“the community of faith,” which cannot be divided and where “bishops, priests and 
laity all together constitute the people of God” (Arola and Saarinen 132), condemn-
ing the very excessive individualism that is promoted by punk. 
This contrast sets the tone for the entire text. One line of the prayer starts with the 
words, “Black robes,” referring to the plain vestment of Orthodox priests and monks. 
Indeed, the very etymology of the word robe (or ryasa in Russian) refers to the Latin 
word rado, which means “wear shabby, threadbare clothes” (Golubinsky 572) and 
should evoke associations with ascetic votaries of God who renounce any of the joys 
of the secular life. Yet, the ending of the line puts the plausibility of this idealistic 
image in doubt. In the words “Black robes, golden epaulettes,” the golden color of 
the clerical dress worn by Orthodox priests during the liturgies (“Tsveta”) that are 
public events worshipping God is placed in opposition with articles of military cloth-
ing (epaulettes) that are symbols of a commitment to protect the interests of the state. 
A similar effect is ensured by the line that starts with the words “the cross-bearer 
procession,” evoking associations with the Orthodox tradition to gather believers for 
a communal outdoor ceremony of bearing the cross or other relics while singing 
prayers and hymns (Purtov). This event is intended to make its participants equal in 
God’s eyes regardless of their background and economic status. Once again, howev-
er, the ending of the line challenges this canonical image. The cross-bearer proces-
sion turns out to consist of “black limousines,” suggesting that some people are 
“more equal than others” in gaining God’s favor. This image refers to the criticism 
raised by the independent press and social media users against the alleged participa-
tion of the Church management in importing alcohol and tobacco products (Solda-
tov), expensive possessions such as exclusive watches (“Patriarkh Kirill Nosit”), a 
yacht (“Yachta”), luxurious motorcades (Soldatov), and favoring some parishioners 
over others by allowing top-ranking officials to venerate Orthodox relics without 
having to stand in a queue (“Power of Attraction”). Notably, this line of reasoning 
was continued by the Pussy Riot members in their public appearances, one of which 
was quoted in the court decision: 
“This [the Cathedral of Christ the Savior] is not a house of God, 
but the office of the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church]. We offi-
cially came to the office of ROC to express our thoughts. The Ca-
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thedral of Christ the Savior looks not like a place of spiritual life, 
but like a business center: banquet room leased for big sums [of 
money], dry cleaners, laundry, secured parking space…” (“Prigo-
vor”) 
This deliberate contrast between the canonical representations of religious devo-
tion and the overtly unrighteous and self-interested behavior of Church leaders is a 
strategy intended to challenge the social norms sustained by the authority of the Or-
thodox Church. 
The experts’ report uses a completely different strategy, “naturalizing” the close 
ties between the church and state while inflating the “taken-for-grantedness” of the 
unacceptability of Pussy Riot’s actions. The discursive devices used to that end ap-
pear early in the report, in the section “Circumstances of the Case,” which is intend-
ed to merely outline the factual information pertaining to the issues under study. 
However, this section describes the Pussy Riot members as wearing “provocatively 
bright balaclavas,” an evaluative judgment with a clearly negative connotation.  
To boost the validity of their arguments, the experts appeal to what they call a 
“fact of common knowledge” and a “fact that does not need proof” and precede their 
conclusions with constructs such as “their [Pussy Riot’s] actions cannot be viewed 
other than . . .” This tactic is surprising, as it is usually the job of experts to provide 
accounts that go beyond commonsense clarifications as well as to challenge them 
with alternatives to ensure that their explanation of the motives and the consequenc-
es of the Pussy Riot performance is the most reasonable one. However, the use of 
these discursive devices makes more sense when looked at as a purposeful strategy 
guided by the consideration that such language choices “make the [decision making] 
process appear as neutral and more objective once presented as a fact” (Machin and 
Mayr 140). By pursuing this strategy, the experts gloss over the fact that some of 
these “factual conclusions” are actually their personal interpretations. Finally, the 
abundance of references to the obviousness and “naturalness” of the findings can be 
viewed as an example of “overlexicalisation,” which usually serves as evidence of 
an “attempt to over-persuade” (Machin and Mayr 222). Remarkably, one of the con-
structions that utilizes the very same strategy, “[the Pussy Riot actions] were quite 
definitely a gross violation of public order,” is meant to justify another very prob-
lematic argument in the prosecution’s case, which is that the violation of public or-
der caused by the Pussy Riot performance was gross and therefore was subject to 
criminal, instead of much more lenient administrative, prosecution. By labeling this 
highly contestable conclusion as “quite definite,” the experts are trying to suggest 
that it is not open to debate. 
In view of these numerous references to the obviousness of their conclusions, it 
seems particularly significant that some truly obvious aspects of the Pussy Riot per-
formance escape the experts’ attention or yield a rather farfetched interpretation. For 
example, the unambiguous mentioning of the Patriarch in the “punk prayer” is not 
addressed by the experts at all. Instead, this Pussy Riot criticism is presented as be-
ing targeted against Orthodox priests as a social group, based on the constructions 
“black robe” and “a teacher-preacher will meet you at school.” Indeed, a singular 
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noun functions here as a stylistic device, widely used in the Russian language to 
describe a group of people, who would normally be denoted with a plural noun, in 
order to make that description more aphoristic and expressive (Golub). However, 
overlooking the parts of the prayer that explicitly mention the name of the Head of 
the Church, for example in the above cited line “Patriarch believes in Putin,” in the 
twenty-one page document produced as a result of the close reading of the one-page 
lyrics of the prayer suggests that it has been a strategic omission. 
Similarly strategic appears to be the experts’ failure to recognize the “prayer’s 
implicit references to Putin. For example, the above-cited line “The head of the 
KGB, their chief saint” is interpreted not as a reference to Putin as the former head of 
the agency that functionally succeeded the KGB but to the Russian security services 
in general and a slander against Orthodox priests. Central to this strategy is the ex-
perts’ decision to analyze this construction partially, without the ending – “Leads 
protesters to prison,” which allows them to conclude that the prayer “does not use 
any offensive words and expressions toward Putin (as compared to the other men-
tioned persons.” The failure to recognize the prayer’s criticism of Putin’s actions, 
such as silencing political opponents or encouraging the further interpenetration of 
the church and state by providing the Orthodox Church with access to educational 
institutions, results in the conclusion that the political motive claimed by Pussy Riot 
was absent from the performance. According to the experts, the only part of the 
prayer that suggests the political motivation is the refrain “Virgin Mary, drive Putin 
away,” which “looks completely extraneous and out of the context of the song, the 
content of which is devoted to insulting and humiliating not Putin, but the social 
group of Orthodox believers” and which “is highly likely to have been used . . . in 
order to artificially position the action as a political protest.” 
Portraying the Pussy Riot performance as criticizing not the activities of particular 
personalities such as the Patriarch and Putin but as “insulting and humiliating” a 
broad group of Orthodox believers – if not all citizens of the country, who, according 
to the report, “respect traditional religions of Russia as an important element of so-
cial life, history, and culture” – serves to marginalize Pussy Riot. By playing on the 
“us vs. them” divide and presenting their actions as deviating from norms followed 
by the majority of the population, who supposedly exceed the supporters of Pussy 
Riot both numerically and in “spiritual wealth,” the report delegitimizes their per-
formance and presents it as crossing socially acceptable boundaries. 
Looking for Contextual Absences 
The Pussy Riot performance is a visually provocative and intellectually challenging 
form of theatre that requires the reader and the viewer to be familiar with the Russian 
social, political, and cultural context to be able to decode its message. Staged in the 
full swing of the presidential campaign, the prayer invoked references to the recent 
public and political events that had been associated with Putin as a candidate in that 
campaign. 
The above-mentioned line “A teacher-preacher will meet you at school / Go to 
class - bring him cash” is one of such examples. In 2010, the government approved 
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teaching religion in the schools of twenty regions of Russia by allowing parents to 
decide whether their children would learn either the basics of religion or secular eth-
ics (“Rasporiazhenie”). In 2012, this practice was extended to the rest of Russia 
(“Poruchenie”). Two weeks before the performance and less than a month before the 
day of the election, the Patriarch hosted a meeting with Putin and called him “surely 
the most likely” winner of the presidential race (“Stenogramma”). The heads of the 
other three religions legally recognized in Russia as traditional were also invited by 
Patriarch “to discuss the future of the country [with Putin] in, first of all, his capacity 
as a presidential candidate.” At the meeting, which was covered by the mainstream 
Russian media as evidence of Patriarch’s direct support (“Patriarkh Kirill Pod-
derzhal”) and blessing (Novikova) of Putin – or, to cite the prayer, “[t]he Church’s 
praise of rotten dictators” – the latter publicly assured the religious leaders of his 
commitment to provide them with access to governmental funding and widen their 
media presence (“Stenogramma”).  
Similarly multi-layered is the line “The belt of the Virgin can’t replace rallies,” 
which evokes references to the official address by the Patriarch to Orthodox believ-
ers three weeks before the performance. Referring to the anti-government protests 
that had been held in Moscow and other Russian cities during the presidential cam-
paign (Barry and Kramer), he warned his parishioners against going into the streets 
by offering a more acceptable way of expressing their concerns: “Orthodox believers 
cannot go to manifestations – they are standing in queues to [venerate the Orthodox 
relic of] the Belt of the Virgin” and “pray in the silence of cloisters, in monastic 
cells, at home” (Intro). According to Patriarch, political protests should make the 
heart of pious believers “bleed” and “draw in their minds clear historical parallels 
with dissipation and frenzy of prerevolutionary years, with disorder, confusion, and 
destruction of the country in the 1990s” (“Slovo”). By evoking references to the 
political protests that happened soon before and after the USSR’s collapse and por-
traying them not as evidence of the political awakening and civic activism of Soviet 
citizens but as “disordering, confusing and destructing” events – much in line with 
the pro-Soviet nostalgic rhetoric employed by Putin – the Patriarch attempts to dele-
gitimize public political protests and push them beyond the boundaries of socially 
acceptable forms of citizens’ civic participation. 
Pussy Riot’s punk prayer is densely packed with political references, which con-
trasts with the experts’ strategy of glossing over the contextual aspects of the per-
formance in their report. One would expect that the analysis of the performance that 
claimed to be political would include at least some references to the political context 
in which it was staged. Yet, this is not what happens in the report. Neglecting to 
mention that the performance was staged during the election campaign is particularly 
telling, considering the marked attention that the report gives to discussing the likely 
motivation and consequences of Pussy Riot’s choice of the venue.  
Much in line with this strategy, the report notes the religious and historical nuanc-
es of the Cathedral’s interior details, including the memorial plaques commemorat-
ing the soldiers who died during the 1812 Napoleonic war, but remains vague about 
the details of the current political and social climate in Russia. This lack of specifici-
ty serves the same delegitimizing function. By decontextualizing the Pussy Riot 
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performance, the text suggests that their “deviant actions” can be neither explained 
nor excused – a typical strategy used to discredit powerless groups, emphasize their 
threat to the interests of the dominant group, and sustain the existing power relations 
(Van Dijuk 263-5). 
Conclusion 
This article examines the discourse surrounding the acceptability of religiously con-
textualized political speech in contemporary Russia by conducting a critical dis-
course analysis of two texts related to the high-profile Pussy Riot blasphemy case: 
the original lyrics of the “punk prayer” performed in the Cathedral of Christ the Sav-
ior and the report from the psychological and linguistic experts that formed the basis 
of the prosecutor’s case.  
As this analysis makes clear, the rhetorical strategies employed by the texts serve 
two opposing goals: the prayer challenges the existing power relations in Russia 
while the report intends to sustain them and delegitimize Pussy Riot’s political pro-
test. These intentions are evident in the strategic use of the discursive devices of both 
texts. 
By describing the social and political climate in Russia, Pussy Riot’s punk prayer 
portrays two actors as possessing (besides the Virgin Mary) the strongest agencies: 
Putin and his political and ideological opponents who, as opposed to the other social 
actors who are constrained in their capacity to act by religious or hegemonic gender 
norms, have the capacity to resist his dominance, even though at the cost of their 
freedom. Despite the use of completely different discursive devices, this layout of 
social forces resonates with the one resulting from the close reading of the experts’ 
report. As in the prayer, the report presents the case as an ideological interplay be-
tween two conflicting sides: the state, committed to protecting social peace and re-
specting religious values, and the Pussy Riot members, who are portrayed as oppo-
nents of this supposedly natural alliance between the church and state. 
In its attempts to discredit Pussy Riot and their supporters, the report employs an 
array of tactics to inflate the “taken-for-grantedness” of the unacceptability of their 
actions, ranging from calling upon common sense and facts “that do not need proof” 
to emphasize the minority position of Pussy Riot in Russian society and arguing that 
it was targeted not at particular individuals such as the Patriarch and Putin but at 
Orthodox believers and citizens of Russia in general. By playing on the “us vs. 
them” divide and presenting the actions of Pussy Riot as deviating from the norms 
accepted by the majority of the population, the report marginalizes them as abnormal 
and perverse.  
The overlexicalization used by the report to persuade the reader of the gravity of 
the damage caused by the Pussy Riot performance is in sharp contrast to the report’s 
failure to describe the political context in Russia that is necessary to understand the 
prayer’s references to recent political and social events and to reveal its political, 
rather than blasphemous, nature.  
The implications of the report’s rhetorical strategy go beyond this individual case. 
By decontextualizing and depoliticizing the performance, which was repeatedly 
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claimed by Pussy Riot members and supporters to be addressing issues of public 
concern, the report trivializes its message and suggests that the damage caused by 
this and other instances of religiously contextualized political speech cannot be justi-
fied.  
According to Sapir, “Different languages . . . shape the world differently. So the 
worlds different language speakers inhabit are not simply ones with different labels 
but are therefore distinct worlds” (209). If applied to the findings of the critical dis-
course analysis presented in this article, this argument suggests that Pussy Riot’s 
punk prayer and the experts’ report on it portray two distinct Russias. The Russia 
advocated by the prayer is the one where no authority, political or religious, is taken 
for granted; where any opinion, no matter how socially acceptable it is claimed to be, 
can and should be contested; and where a riot is a way of dealing with a state that 
has not created easily accessible sites for public discussion. The Russia of the ex-
perts’ report, however, has a small, and shrinking, space for acceptable public de-
bate, where religion is used as a tool to neutralize threats to the established power 
relations, and where civil obedience is promoted as a safe, natural, and legitimate 
modus operandi for citizens. 
 
1  The prayer employed the opening melody and refrain of the famous “Rejoice, 
Mother of God” from the “All Night Vigil” by Sergei Rachmaninov (Denysenko 
1071). 
2  I organize my presentation of the findings around these three research questions, 
emphasizing that my primary interest is in the analysis of the strategies used by 
these texts, rather than their normative evaluation. 
3  This is the form of the Patriarch’s name used in the original Russian version of 
the prayer. The absolute majority of the English language translations of the 
prayer (Denysenko 1069; Gessen 118), including those provided by the Pussy 
Riot members themselves (“Alekhina and Others v. Russia”), used the actual, not 
derogatory, version of the Patriarch’s secular name. Given the focus of this arti-
cle, I use for analysis the literal translation of the original version. 
4  Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, FSB / Federal Securi-
ty Service of the Russian Federation. 
5  Siberia has historically been a place of political exile and imprisonment of the 
government’s opponents in Russia (Gruszczynska and Kaczynska 106). 
6  The first question asked “whether the Pussy Riot’s actions can be viewed as 
gross violation of generally accepted norms and behavior standards manifesting 
patent contempt of society and/or a particular social group” (Feygin) and was 
meant to reveal the presence of the actus reus element of hooliganism. The sec-
ond one asked “whether these actions can be viewed as motivated by political, 
ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity with respect to a social 




ganism – mens rea. 
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